We study the effect of the competitive selection process on the economy's rate of growth. In an extension of standard quality-ladder models of endogenous growth, we allow for the possibility that in each period several asymmetric firms (representing an endogenously determined number of past innovators) may be simultaneously active in an industry. Stronger competitive pressure then has conflicting effects on the incentive to innovate, lowering prices but also selecting the more efficient firms. We show that the market selection effect of competition always increases the incentive to innovate and find circumstances in which it can outweigh the traditional negative effect of lower prices. * We are grateful to three anonymous referees and Editor Antonio Ciccone for useful comments and suggestions on previous versions of this paper. We also benefited from comments by
Introduction
One of the many reasons why economists praise competition is that it improves the process of output reallocation between producers, selecting the more efficient firms and weeding out the less efficient. This competitive selection process is especially important in growing economies, where productivity changes continuously with technical progress. In the growth literature, most Schumpeterian models of endogenous growth posit competition so intense that only the most productive firm is active in each industry at any time, implying that there is no room for further improvement in the process of market selection. But there is ample empirical evidence of micro-level heterogeneity in productivity across firms, which suggests that in real life competition may not be as intense.
If this is so, an increase in competitive pressure can still improve the process of market selection. This is certainly good for static efficiency, but what effect does it have on the incentive to innovate, and hence the growth rate of the economy? Our thesis is that stronger competitive selection is also good for growth, and its positive effect can be great enough to outweigh the traditional negative Schumpeterian effect.
Thus, our analysis can help explain the positive or uncertain relationship between competition and growth found in the empirical literature. 1 To demonstrate our results, we extend standard quality-ladder models of endogenous growth to allow for the possibility that several asymmetric firms (representing an endogenously determined number of successive innovators) can be active in an industry at the same time. In early Schumpeterian models, it is an equilibrium property that the technological leader should be the sole active firm. This follows from the postulate that innovations are drastic, or else firms compete a là Bertrand. 2 Our 1 The many empirical studies of the relationship between competition and growth have generally found that competition tends to be positively associated with innovation, or that the relationship between the two is inverse U-shaped: see for an excellent survey.
2 See Aghion and Howitt (1992), Grossman and Helpman (1991) , and Segerstrom et al. (1990 ).
An innovation is "drastic" if it is so large that the innovator is effectively unconstrained by outside competition and can therefore engage in monopoly pricing.
extension is to assume that innovations are non-drastic and that firms compete a là Cournot. (We also use a conjectural-variations reduced-form model that encompasses the Bertrand and Cournot equilibria as special cases, yielding a continuous index of the intensity of competition. 3 ) As a result, our model possesses a steady state in which m + 1 firms are active at each point in time, i.e., m past innovators plus the latest innovator. An innovator who does not engage in any further R&D will be displaced gradually, remaining active and reaping positive profits for m + 1 periods: he is the technological leader in the first period after his innovation, but becomes the second most efficient in the following period, and so on. 4 As further innovations arrive his market share shrinks, but he will not leave the market until after m + 1 successive innovations. The number of active firms and their respective market shares are determined endogenously as a function of the intensity of competition, the elasticity of demand, and the size of innovations (Proposition 1).
The analysis of a quality-ladder endogenous growth model with Cournot competition between asymmetric firms is a contribution that may be interesting in its own right, 5 but for our purposes it serves mainly as a term of comparison with the familiar case of Bertrand competition, since our objective is to analyze how more intense competition affects the incentive to innovate. The analysis starts from the observation that an innovator's life cycle reflects the industry as a whole, since over the successive time periods he will occupy all the positions in the industry, from the 3 In the endogenous growth literature, the intensity of competition is often measured by the elasticity of demand, which determines the size of the innovator's mark-up. Allowing for several active firms, one can instead focus on behavioural parameters, uncoupling changes in the degree of competition from those in taste and/or technology that ultimately determine the elasticity of demand. For a neat illustration of the shortcomings of measuring the intensity of competition through a structural determinant of the elasticity of demand, see Koeniger and Licandro (2006) . 4 A period is the random time interval between two innovations. 5 Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999) also develop a Schumpeterian quality-ladder model with Cournot competition. However, they assume that patents expire when further innovation occurs, i.e., innovation k falls into the public domain as soon as innovation k + 1 arrives. With this assumption, the equilibrium price with Cournot competition is the same as with Bertrand competition, and even though the latest innovator does not produce all of the output, he reaps positive profits for only one period.
most to the least efficient firm. In each period of this life cycle the innovator obtains positive profits, whose discounted sum represents the incentive to innovate.
As the intensity of competition increases, opposing effects arise. First, the equilibrium price in innovative industries goes down, unambiguously reducing the innovator's expected profits (the price effect). However, the number of active firms and their market shares also change: specifically, the market shares of efficient firms increase and those of inefficient firms decrease, possibly driving some of the latter out of the market (market selection). What is the effect of stronger market selection on the incentive to innovate?
Since each innovator will inevitably become a relatively inefficient firm as new innovations arrive, at first sight the reallocation of market shares seems neutral for innovators' expected profits. On closer inspection, however, stronger market selection increases the incentive to innovate in two ways. First, the innovator gains more from his greater market share when he is relatively more efficient (hence with a larger price-cost margin) than he loses from the decrease when he is relatively less efficient and his margin is small. We call this the productive efficiency effect. Second, the reallocation of market shares has a front-end-loading effect, since it makes profits accrue to the innovator sooner. With Cournot competition, for instance, it may take several periods for an innovator to complete collecting his rents, whereas with
Bertrand competition all profits are obtained in the first period after the innovation.
We show that the front-end-loading effect of more intense competition is always good for growth (Proposition 2). Then, a sufficient condition for more intense competition to increase the economy's rate of growth is that the productive efficiency effect outweighs the negative price effect. We identify two circumstances in which this condition holds: large innovations (Proposition 3) and tough competition (Proposition 4). In these circumstances, competition is certainly good for growth.
Our qualitative results are local, but numerical calculations show that competition can be good for growth for a sizeable region of parameter values, which includes those usually considered realistic. This suggests that the mechanisms identified here are more than a theoretical possibility. Although we make no attempt to bring the model to the data, our analysis carries several implications for empirical work. For example, it suggests that strong market concentration may be taken as a proxy for more intense competition, not less. We discuss these issues more fully in the concluding section.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the literature. Section 3 outlines a simple quality-ladder model of endogenous growth.
Section 4 focuses on the product market equilibrium, allowing for the possibility that several firms can be simultaneously active. Section 5 determines the value of an innovation, and hence the incentive to innovate, when innovators are displaced by subsequent innovations gradually. Section 6 analyzes how the intensity of product market competition affects the incentive to innovate and derives the main results.
Section 7 summarizes and concludes. All proofs are collected in the Appendix.
The literature
We are not the first to incorporate the competitive selection process in an endogenous growth model. 6 To reconcile endogenous growth theory and empirical evidence that competition is good for growth, Aghion et al. (2001) and others develop models of endogenous growth where in each industry only two incumbents can invest in R&D. 7 Since the two incumbents can be asymmetric, these models do capture the 6 The market selection process has also been incorporated in models where growth is not driven by R&D. Acemoglu et al. (2006) , for instance, assume that firms can be run by good or bad managers. The closer a firm is to the technological frontier, which shifts over time because of exogenous technical progress, the more valuable a good manager. As a result, institutions that facilitate the selection of good managers become more important as a country gets closer to the technological frontier. Luttmer (2007) develops a model where growth is the result of idiosyncratic firm productivity shocks, market selection, and imitation by entrants. His calibration of the model suggests that nearly half of growth can be attributed to market selection. (2005) is an attempt to bring the model to the data. These papers model innovation as a step-bystep process with no leapfrogging, which marks another difference from early Schumpeterian models.
In an important contribution, however, Encaoua and Ulph (2004) show that a positive relationship between competition and growth may obtain in these models even allowing for leapfrogging. Generally speaking, whether it is more appropriate to model innovations as proceeding step-by-step or to process of market selection, but the mechanism that drives a positive (or inverse-U shaped) relationship between competition and growth is quite different from ours.
If, as they assume, only incumbents can innovate, the incentive to innovate is the incremental profit, i.e., the difference over the firm's current profit. An increase in product market competition can decrease both prospective and current profits, yet increase the difference. This is what generally happens when firms are neck-and-neck,
producing an "escape-competition" effect that explains why more intense competition may be beneficial to growth in these models. 8 We differ from this literature by assuming that outsiders can conduct research on an equal footing with incumbents, as in early Schumpeterian models. Because of Arrow's replacement effect, in equilibrium outsiders will conduct all of the research, 9 so the escape-competition effect cannot arise. From this viewpoint, the contribution of this paper is to show that stronger competitive selection can generate a positive relationship between competition and growth even in the absence of an escape-competition effect.
That stronger competitive selection can increase the incentive to innovate is also the thesis of part of the industrial organization literature. In partial equilibrium modallow for leapfrogging may depend on how innovations are protected. As Encaoua and Ulph (2004) discuss at some length, if innovators rely on patent protection, it seems reasonable to assume that laggards can leapfrog, because all innovative knowledge must in principle be disclosed in the patent specification. If instead innovators rely on secrecy or tacit knowledge, then laggards must duplicate the leader's innovative knowledge before moving up the quality ladder and we have step-by-step innovations. 8 That more intense competition may increase incremental profits was first pointed out in a partial equilibrium framework by Delbono and Denicolò (1990) . Following Beath et al. (1989) , they distinguish between two notions of incremental profits, the "profit incentive" and the "competitive threat," and show that both can be greater under Bertrand than under Cournot competition when firms are neck-and-neck. 9 This implication is admittedly unrealistic. There have been various attempts to extend early Schumpeterian models to allow for repeated inventions by incumbents. In one strand of the literature, incumbents are assumed to have a limited advantage in conducting research, such as a first-mover advantage, and to conduct all research preemptively. Denicolò (2001) and Etro (2004) show that in such a preemptive equilibrium the level of innovative activity is still determined by the outsiders' incentive to innovate. This means that our results could be extended to such a framework, as we showed in a previous version of this paper. However, a more general analysis, in which neither insiders nor outsiders are precluded from innovating, has yet to be done. els of horizontal product differentiation with asymmetric firms, Aghion and Schankerman (1999, 2004) , Boone (2001) , and Zanchettin (2006) show that the competitive selection effect, which increases the market shares of the more efficient firms, can actually increase their profits. As a result, innovators, which naturally tend to be more efficient, can benefit from stronger competition. These papers focus on standalone innovations, however, where the incentive to innovate is simply given by the (incremental) profit of a successful innovator. In this case, the fact that more efficient firms hold larger market shares when competition is more intense directly increases the incentive to innovate. In our general equilibrium model, by contrast, there is an infinite sequence of innovations, and innovators are displaced gradually, so a firm's life cycle re-produces the industry pattern and the value of an innovation is thus a weighted sum of lifetime profits, where the weights reflect the expected length of time periods, discounting, and growth. In this framework, the fact that more efficient firms hold larger market shares operates more subtly, through the front-end-loading and the productive efficiency effect, as discussed above. 10 
The model
We present a simple quality-ladder model of endogenous growth. We use a one-sector version of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004, ch. 7), but our results are more general and can be reproduced in many other models, with or without scale effects.
Preferences and technology
The economy is populated by identical, infinitely-lived individuals whose mass is normalized to one. Each individual inelastically supplies one unit of labour and has 1 0 In this respect, our analysis is closer to Segal and Whinston (2007) , who study a partial equilibrium model of successive innovations in which each innovator may be active for several periods. However, their model differs from ours in several other respects; for example, it posits that there can be at most two active firms, and that an innovation drives the incumbent out of the market after a period whose length is exogenously given. Moreover, they do not compare Bertrand and Cournot competition, but focus on various business practices that may or may not be anti-competitive.
linear intertemporal preferences:
so that the equilibrium rate of interest is fixed and coincides with the rate of time preference r. 11 Time is continuous but can be divided into periods: as in Aghion and Howitt (1992), a period is the random time interval between two successive innovations.
There is a unique final good in the economy that can be consumed, used to produce In period k, (k being the number of past innovations) the final good y k can be produced according to the following constant-returns production function:
where L is labour input, (1 − α) is the income share of labour, and x i,k denotes the input of the intermediate good of vintage k − i. Hence,
adjusted index of a composite good that combines all past generations of intermediate goods, which are perfect substitutes at fixed ratios. It is convenient to rewrite the Euler equation gives an increasing relationship between the interest rate and the economy's rate of growth. The analysis below provides another, decreasing relationship. These two equations can be solved simultaneously to determine the equilibrium interest rate and growth rate. Any effect of the intensity of competition on the incentive to innovate now affects both the interest rate and the rate of growth. Quantitatively, the effects identified in this paper are attenuated, but their sign does not change.
input equal to one, the production function (2) becomes
Profit maximization by the final good sector implies the following demand for the intermediate good, measured in efficiency units:
where p k is the price for the intermediate good in period k. The demand function (4) has a constant elasticity (4) is the true, objective demand function, and any other "perceived" demand function would be hard to justify. Alternatively, one could model a continuum of intermediate goods; then, the producer of a single capital good would not internalize the macroeconomic effects of its choice, which are indeed negligible, but only the substitution between different capital goods. In such a multi-sector model, the elasticity of demand would reflect the elasticity of substitution but all of our results would continue to hold provided that the elasticity is lower than one. For simplicity, we posit a one-sector economy. must be greater than θ, the effective unit cost of the latest innovator's most efficient competitor. With a constant elasticity of demand 1 1−α and a marginal cost equal to 1, the monopoly price is 1 α . Therefore, we henceforth assume θ < 1 α .
Technical progress
In each period k there is a patent race for innovation k + 1. The size of innovations is exogenous, θ, but the timing is a probabilistic function of the amount invested in R&D by research firms, so innovations occur at a rate determined by R&D effort. Like traditional Schumpeterian models, we assume that incumbents have no advantage over outsiders in conducting research and that there is free entry by outsiders. Arrow's replacement effect then implies that research is conducted only by outsiders, 13 so in each period the current leader is systematically overtaken. However, each innovator may stay active in the product market for several periods, being displaced only gradually by subsequent innovations.
In period k, each outside firm ℓ in the patent race decides its R&D effort n ℓk , in terms of the numeraire, to obtain the k + 1-th innovation. The R&D effort is a flow cost that determines the expected time of successful completion of the R&D project according to a Poisson discovery process with a hazard rate equal to λ k n ℓk , with λ k > 0. The projects of different firms are independent, so that the aggregate instantaneous probability of success is simply the sum of the individual probabilities.
Let n k ≡ ℓ n ℓk denote aggregate R&D investment per unit of time in period k.
Then, the k + 1-th innovation occurs according to a Poisson process with a hazard
Innovative technological knowledge is proprietary: there is perfect, infinitely-lived patent protection, meaning that nobody can imitate an innovation. Thus, in each period only the k-th innovator, who holds a patent on the k-th innovation, can produce the intermediate good of vintage k. 14 Since all innovations are obtained 1 3 Other things being equal, incumbents have less incentive to innovate than outsiders, because part of the prospective profits would just replace their current profits. 1 4 We follow the vast majority of endogenous growth models in ruling out patent licensing. The by outsiders, nobody holds multiple patents.
Steady state
Our model economy may exhibit transitional dynamics or persistent cyclical growth. 15 Abstracting from any such dynamics, we consider only the steady state. A steady state is defined as a situation in which the expected duration of time periods is constant and the economy grows proportionally from one period to the next. 16 This requires that all quantities and the wage rate are constant within each period and grow by a constant factor across periods, whereas the hazard rate, the price of the intermediate good, and the number of active firms are constant both within and between periods.
Assume for the time being that a steady state exists. Since the price of the intermediate good is constant, it is clear from (4) that X k must grow at rate θ α 1−α from one period to the next. It follows immediately from (3) that y k , the wage rate, etc. will also grow at rate θ α 1−α . Thus, θ α 1−α is the growth factor between periods; it will be denoted by g.
To guarantee the existence of a steady state, we must ensure that the expected duration of time periods can be constant. Since in a steady state R&D investment n k grows at rate g then in order for the hazard rate z k = λ k n k to be constant the productivity of R&D, λ k , must decline at rate g. This requires the knife-edge assumption λ k = λg −k , which is common to all R&D-driven endogenous growth standard justification for this assumption is that licensing agreements between successive innovators would have anti-competitive effects and thus would be prohibited by antitrust authorities. In our model, however, such licensing agreements could be drafted so as to improve productive efficiency with no anti-competitive effects. Thus ruling them out is not an innocuous assumption. However, innovative technological knowledge may be difficult to codify and transmit to others and a variety of transaction costs impede licensing, so it is unlikely that licensing will be widespread enough to nullify the market selection effect. 1 5 Transitional dynamics arise if the initial conditions do not conform to the steady state properties.
If the technology of vintage 0 is in the public domain, for instance, innovator 1 will compete against a competitive fringe instead of m past innovators. For a discussion of cyclical growth, see Aghion and Howitt (1992 
If this condition is violated, the utility u is unbounded.
Product market equilibrium
Now we derive the product market equilibrium, accounting for the possibility that Since innovations are non-drastic and in a leapfrogging equilibrium the secondbest quality is available to a non-leading firm, the leader is generally constrained by outside competition. The product market equilibrium depends on the strength of this competitive pressure.
Bertrand competition
In this case the outcome is a limit-pricing equilibrium where the leader prices at p B = θ, the unit cost of his most efficient competitor, and drives all his competitors out of the market. In this equilibrium, only the most productive vintage is produced, so there is no productive inefficiency. Equilibrium profits are . 17 For m + 1 to be the equilibrium number of active firms, however, this candidate equilibrium price must be lower than θ m+1 (otherwise more firms would enter) and greater than θ m (otherwise some supposedly active firms would make negative profits and exit). It follows that m C is the smallest integer such that p C ≤ θ m C +1 , where the Cournot equilibrium price p C is:
Clearly, the Cournot equilibrium price is higher than the Bertrand, 18 and both are independent of the shift parameters in the demand curve (this is a consequence of the curve being iso-elastic).
Aggregate output X C k is obtained by substituting (6) into (4). Individual outputs x C i,k can be easily calculated exploiting the fact that the ratio between any two active 1 7 The calculations are simpler if we exploit the well-known property of the Cournot equilibrium that the equilibrium price depends only on the unweighted average of the individual unit costs and is independent of the distribution of costs across firms: see Bergstrom and Varian (1985) . This property guarantees that the Cournot equilibrium price is the same as if all the m + 1 active firms shared the same unit cost c = . With an iso-elastic demand and a symmetric unit cost c, it is a standard exercise to calculate the Cournot equilibrium price as
where ε is the elasticity of demand. Since in our model ε = 1 1−α , the expression in the text follows immediately. 1 8 To show that p C > p B = θ, note that
firms' market shares is equal to that between their price-cost margins. 19 We obtain:
where it is understood that x C i,k = 0 when p C ≤ θ i .
Productive inefficiency
Equation (7) 
Not only is such productive inefficiency a source of social costs, it is also bad for profits. For example, a reallocation of market shares from more to less efficient firms increasesc k , and hence entails greater productive inefficiency. Other things being equal, this translates directly into lower profits for an innovator. The reason is that for any given price, an innovator gains less from his greater market share when he is relatively less efficient (hence with a smaller price-cost margin) than he loses from the decrease when he is relatively more efficient and his margin is large. This intuition will be confirmed by our analytical study in section 6. 1 9 This property of the Cournot equilibrium follows directly from the first-order conditions
is the inverse demand function and to simplify the notation we have dropped the time indices. Given the equilibrium price (6), the ensuing conditions Cournot. The conjectural variations parameter ν, which measures the hypothetical change in the competitors' aggregate output associated with a unit change in own output, is assumed to be the same for all firms. Although ν is apparently a behavioral parameter, it may also be taken as a metaphor for any mechanism that intensifies product market competition. 20 Proceeding as for Cournot competition, we obtain the following equilibrium price: 21
Conjectural variations
where m(ν) is the smallest integer such that p(ν) ≤ θ m(ν)+1 . Differentiating (8), it is clear that the equilibrium price decreases with ν. 22 The Cournot solution is obtained 2 0 With capacity constraints or adjustment costs, for instance, the intensity of competition is related negatively to the slope of the marginal cost curve beyond the capacity level (Maggi, 1994 ), or to the size of the costs firms face when scaling output up or down (Dockner, 1992) . The intensity of competition is also related negatively to the degree of collusion (Cabral, 1995) , and positively to firms' aggressiveness when they choose simultaneously quantities and prices (d 'Aspremont et al., 2007) . 2 1 In a conjectural variations equilibrium, the first-order conditions for profit maximization become
The factor (1 − ν) that multiplies the first term on the left-hand side changes the perceived elasticity of demand, which is now effectively
. With this insight, equation (8) follows immediately by the same logic as in footnote 17. 2 2 The equilibrium price p depends on ν both directly and through m. Since m(ν) jumps down at certain critical points as ν increases, the equilibrium price is differentiable with respect to ν only piecewise. But the price is continuous in ν at these critical points. As a result, if the partial derivative of p with respect to ν is negative, as it indeed is, the equilibrium price is necessarily monotonically decreasing in the intensity of competition. A similar logic applies to the derivatives with respect to ν of other variables, which depend also on m.
for ν = 0 and the Bertrand solution for ν = ν B , where 23
The equilibrium aggregate output and individual outputs can be calculated as for Cournot competition. For future reference, notice the following relationship between any two firms' profits:
The reason why the ratio between firms' profits is proportional to the squared ratio between price-cost margins is that in any conjectural variations equilibrium market shares are proportional to margins, as in the Cournot equilibrium. This latter property also implies that a rise in competitive pressure reallocates output from less to more efficient firms. This is an important feature of the competitive selection process, one that drives most of our results.
Competition and the number of active firms
Our first proposition highlights another, related aspect: as competitive pressure mounts, past innovators are driven out of the market more quickly and the number of active firms decreases. Actually, the number of active firms is piecewise constant because of the integer number problem: when ν rises, m almost always remains constant and falls to the integer immediately below only when ν passes certain critical thresholds, which we calculate explicitly below. The same is true of changes in θ and α. With this caveat, we can state: Proposition 1. The number of active firms is a step-wise decreasing function of the intensity of competition, the magnitude of innovations, and the elasticity of demand.
The negative effect of sharper competition on the equilibrium number of firms has been emphasized in the industrial organization literature since Demsetz (1972) 2 3 In the symmetric case (θ = 1), the Bertrand solution is obtained when ν = 1, but when firms are asymmetric the critical value of ν that reproduces the Bertrand equilibrium is less than 1 and depends on the magnitude of innovations and the elasticity of demand.
and Vickers (1995) , but the endogenous growth literature has tended to overlook it.
For any given intensity of competition, a swifter replacement of past innovators is also caused by an increase in the magnitude of innovations (which accentuates cost asymmetry between successive innovators), and in the elasticity of demand (which lowers the price-cost margin, leaving less room for inefficient firms).
Using (8), we can calculate explicitly the critical thresholds mentioned above:
there are exactly m + 1 active firms when 24
[insert Figure for successive values of m. The grey area in Figure 1 corresponds to the "reasonable" 2 4 When mθ m − (1 + θ + ... + θ m−1 ) = (1 − α)(1 − ν)θ m , the equilibrium price is exactly equal to the unit cost of the marginal firm, which will then produce zero output. We consider such a marginal firm non-active. 2 5 With θ = 1.15, the average gross markup (the ratio of price to the industry's average cost) can be computed as 1.22 when α = 0.7 and 1.40 when α = 0.3. These values seem consistent with empirical estimates of the gross markup: see e.g. Basu (1996) . 
Equilibrium growth
In this section we derive the equilibrium growth rate as a function of an innovator's prospective profits. This will allow us to analyze, in section 6, the effect of the intensity of competition on the economy's growth rate. We begin by determining the incentive to innovate in an economy where innovators are displaced gradually.
The incentive to innovate
When innovators are displaced gradually, their rents are not terminated immediately by the subsequent innovation. The expected value of innovation k + 1,
is determined by the following asset condition:
where E(V h k+1 ) is the value of innovation k +1 after h periods, i.e., in period k +1+h.
This equation says that securities issued by the k + 1-th innovator pay the flow profit π 0,k+1 in period k + 1, less the expected capital loss z k+1 E(V k+1 ) − E(V 1 k+1 ) that will be incurred when the next innovation occurs. This capital loss is the difference between the value of being leader and that of being the second most efficient firm, i.e.
). The value of being the second most efficient firm in the market,
, is in turn determined by the asset condition
and so on. Eventually, after m + 1 innovations, the k + 1-th innovator leaves the market, so E(V m+1 k+1 ) = 0. Consequently, we have
This system is recursive, as the last equation solves for E(V m k+1 ), and then given E(V m k+1 ) the penultimate equation solves for E(V m−1 k+1 ), and so on. We obtain:
When m = 0, this expression reduces to the standard formula E(V k+1 ) = π 0,k+1 r+z k+1
, which says that the value of the k + 1-th innovation is obtained by discounting the innovator's flow profits by an interest rate augmented by the factor z k+1 , which captures the hazard rate at which the innovator's leadership ends. In general, equation (15) tells us that the value of an innovation is the expected present value of all future profits that the innovator will earn in the m + 1 periods for which he will be active in the product market. In each period, the discount factor is augmented to keep account of the probability that the current flow of profits will be terminated by the occurrence of the next innovation. Moreover, future profits are weighted by the fac-
, which can be interpreted as the "discount-adjusted probabilities"
that future innovations will be achieved: with a Poisson discovery process, each future innovation eventually occurs with probability 1, but since there is discounting, delayed success counts less than instant success.
In a steady state, z is constant and profits grow at rate g between periods: π i,k ≡ π i g k . Equation (15) then reduces to:
Equilibrium
The expected discounted profit of an outsider firm that invests n ℓk units of the final good in period k to obtain innovation k + 1 is
Because there is free entry, in equilibrium the expected profit must vanish; hence the following condition must hold:
This zero-profit condition determines the aggregate R&D effort and hence the aggregate hazard rate z k . 26 In a steady state, inserting (16) into the zero-profit condition
Equation (18) determines the equilibrium steady state hazard rate, z * . Given the growth factor between periods, g, the expected rate of growth depends only on the expected length of the periods, which in turn depends on the speed of technical progress. With an exponential distribution of the timing of success, the equilibrium expected waiting time for each innovation is 1 z * . Thus, the equilibrium hazard rate z * fully determines the economy's expected rate of growth, which is z * log g. By implicit differentiation, it can be checked that the steady-state level of research z * is a decreasing function of the rate of time preference r and an increasing function of both the productivity of R&D effort λ and the magnitude of innovations θ.
Competition and growth
We are now ready to analyze the effect of an increase in the intensity of competition on the economy's rate of growth. We identify a price effect, a front-end-loading effect, and a productive efficiency effect of competition. The price effect is negative and is the only effect at work with one active firm, or when all active firms are symmetric.
The other mechanisms introduced in this paper work in the opposite direction and arise when several asymmetric firms are simultaneously active in an industry.
Let us denote by
i+1 the left-hand side of equation (18) Lemma 2 suggests that we consider how the intensity of competition affects the incentive to innovate V . As we have seen, V is the discounted sum of the profits obtained by the innovator over all the periods in which he is active. As such, it depends both on the level of the profits and their distribution over time. To disentangle the effect on the level of an innovator's prospective profits from that on their timing, we introduce some further notation. Let Π s ≡ s i=0 π i denote the cumulative undiscounted profits that would accrue to an innovator over the first s + 1 periods of activity in a stationary environment with no growth, with Π ≡ Π m denoting the corresponding total profits. That is, Π is an unweighted sum of an innovator's profits over time periods that abstracts from the variable duration of periods, growth, and discounting. With this notation, the incentive to innovate V is rewritten as (see the proof of Proposition 2 in the Appendix)
The first term on the right-hand side of (19) captures the level of the innovator's profits, the second term their timing.
Competition and the timing of profits
Since r > z(g − 1), early profits have a greater effect on the incentive to innovate than late profits, and competition improves the timing of profits. This leads to the following: Proposition 2. If total profits Π increase weakly with the intensity of competition ν, then the incentive to innovate V increases strictly with ν.
The timing of profits improves with the intensity of competition because stronger competitive pressure has a front-end-loading effect. The intuitive reason is twofold.
First, stronger competition increases the market shares of the more efficient firms (the latest innovators) and decreases those of the less efficient (the oldest innovators).
Second, sharper competition lowers the equilibrium price, but for any given fall in the price, the percentage decrease in the price-cost margin is greater for inefficient than for efficient firms. These effects imply that when the market becomes more competitive, new innovators gain and old innovators lose, in relative terms. This front-end-loading effect is always good for the incentive to innovate: although deferred profits are increased by economic growth, they must also be discounted, and by the "transversality" condition (5), discounting prevails over growth.
Competition and total profits
We now look for conditions under which more intense competition increases the unweighted sum of profits Π; given Proposition 2, these conditions will guarantee that competition is good for growth.
One may wonder whether it is at all possible for more intense competition to increase total profits. As we have seen, more intense competition decreases the equilibrium price and this generally tends to lower total profits when all active firms have the same unit cost. This is the standard price effect, which explains why in early Schumpeterian models of endogenous growth the incentive to innovate decreases with the intensity of competition. With asymmetric firms, however, there is also a counter-vailing effect: more intense competition reduces the market shares of old innovators and augments those of newcomers. Since the latest innovators have higher price-cost margins than the older ones, this effect tends to increase the total profits an innovator earns over his life cycle.
To identify these effects analytically, notice that π i = π i,k g −k and hence Π = (8), X depends on ν through p (from (4) one gets X = α shares. The change in total profits Π can then be written as dΠ dν = X + (p −c) dX dp dp dν
productive efficiency effect (20) The price effect is negative, since in our model Π is concave in p and the price is always lower than the monopoly price. If the average costc were independent of the intensity of competition, the change in total profits would be negative. However, it can be shown that The intuition here is that when ν is sufficiently close to ν B , the penultimate innovator is the only active firm other than the latest innovator, and his market share is already small. Now, a small increase in the intensity of competition, which slightly reduces the equilibrium price, has a dramatic percentage effect on the market share of the old innovator, implying that the productive efficiency effect is very large.
[insert Figure [insert Figure 3 around here]
Competition and welfare
Although a detailed welfare analysis is beyond the scope of this paper, a few remarks are in order. More intense competition has both a static and a dynamic effect on social welfare. The static effect is unambiguously positive: for any given state of the technology, the sharper the competition, the lower the price and the greater the output. Further, more intense competition improves the economy's productive efficiency. The dynamic effect, which operates via the incentive to innovate, is more complex. As we have seen, competition can be growth-enhancing or growthinhibiting. In addition, the equilibrium rate of growth may exceed the socially optimal rate, which means that faster growth is not necessarily socially beneficial. Therefore, the overall welfare effect of more intense competition is in principle ambiguous; a more detailed analysis of the issue is left for future work.
Conclusion
After a recapitulation, we shall offer some brief remarks on the robustness of our analysis and its implications for policy and empirical work.
Synopsis
We have extended standard quality-ladder models of endogenous growth to allow for several asymmetric firms (representing an endogenously determined number of past innovators) to be simultaneously active in an industry. Our model allows the extent of competition to vary and to be less intense than Bertrand competition -the case that the earlier literature has considered. We have used this model to analyze the process whereby stronger competitive pressure increases the market shares of the more efficient firms and reduces those of the less efficient. There are two reasons why this reallocation of market shares is good for the incentive to innovate, and hence for growth. First, over his life cycle an innovator gains more from his greater market share when he is relatively more efficient than he loses from the decrease when he is relatively less efficient (the productive efficiency effect). Second, profits accrue to the innovator sooner (the front-end-loading effect). These effects countervail the traditional negative Schumpeterian effect and can generate a positive relationship between competition and growth.
Robustness
Although for concreteness we have used a specific endogenous growth model, we believe our main results can be reproduced in most, if not all, quality-ladder models that exhibit a positive relationship between the incentive to innovate and the economy's rate of growth. Many general equilibrium details of the model, that is to say, can be modified without changing the qualitative conclusions. We believe that the same holds for certain assumptions on the microeconomic structure of the innovative industry: even though we have focused on a model where the product is differentiated only vertically and there are no fixed costs, the front-end-loading and productive efficiency effects also operate under more general conditions. Another approach, for instance, would be to introduce horizontal product differentiation. Sticking to
Bertrand competition, the intensity of competition could then be measured by the degree of product substitutability. The results of Aghion and Schankerman (2004) and Zanchettin (2006) suggest that a positive relationship between competition and growth can also emerge within such a framework. As for fixed costs, they generally speed up the displacement of innovators by subsequent innovations. However, as long as several asymmetric firms are active simultaneously, the effects we have highlighted continue to operate.
Implications for empirical work
For the purposes of empirical analysis, the main implication of our model is that some indices that are commonly taken as negative measures of the intensity of competition may in fact be positively related to it. This is true, for instance, of any concentration index, suggesting caution in interpreting certain empirical results. The analysis also suggests that while any individual firm's price-cost margin is a proper measure of the intensity of competition, when these margins are weighted together with weights reflecting firms' market shares, as is often done in empirical work, the resulting aggregate index may increase with the conjectural variations parameter ν.
On the positive side, certain proxies of the intensity of competition used in empirical work, such as exogenous changes in antitrust policy, can often be naturally mapped into changes in ν (Aghion et al., 2005) .
Another testable implication of our analysis is that sharper competition tends to be positively associated with growth when the step-size of innovations is large.
Since in equilibrium large innovations will also be more frequent, this suggests that a positive association between competition and innovation is more likely to be found in highly innovative industries.
Policy implications
For policy purposes, the model suggests that one must distinguish between the effects of more competition in the product market and the research sector. Ideally, policy should allow the latest innovator to compete vigorously against past innovators, since this improves the process of market selection; at the same time, however, it should combat the entrenchment of monopoly, preventing incumbents from exploiting their market power to impede entry by subsequent innovators. Striking a balance between these objectives is perhaps the main current challenge for competition policy.
Appendix
This Appendix contains all proofs that are omitted in the text.
Proof of Proposition 1. Define Ω(m) ≡ A sufficient condition for ∂V ∂z to be negative is that π i ≥ gπ i+1 , or, in view of (10), 
